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Abstract
Background: In many different countries the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPS)
is used to assess the safety culture in hospitals. Accordingly, the questionnaire has been translated
into Dutch for application in the Netherlands. The aim of this study was to examine the underlying
dimensions and psychometric properties of the questionnaire in Dutch hospital settings, and to
compare these results with the original questionnaire used in USA hospital settings.
Methods: The HSOPS was completed by 583 staff members of four general hospitals, three
teaching hospitals, and one university hospital in the Netherlands. Confirmatory factor analyses
were performed to examine the applicability of the factor structure of the American questionnaire
to the Dutch data. Explorative factor analyses were performed to examine whether another
composition of items and factors would fit the data better. Supplementary psychometric analyses
were performed, including internal consistency and construct validity.
Results: The confirmatory factor analyses were based on the 12-factor model of the original
questionnaire and resulted in a few low reliability scores. 11 Factors were drawn with explorative
factor analyses, with acceptable reliability scores and a good construct validity. Two items were
removed from the questionnaire. The composition of the factors was very similar to that of the
original questionnaire. A few items moved to another factor and two factors turned out to combine
into a six-item dimension. All other dimensions consisted of two to five items.
Conclusion: The Dutch translation of the HSOPS consists of 11 factors with acceptable reliability
and good construct validity. and is similar to the original HSOPS factor structure.
Background
Patient safety is an important component of healthcare
quality. Several studies in various countries have shown
that 2.9% to 16.6% of patients in acute care hospitals
experience one or more adverse events [1-9]. Approxi-
mately 50% of the adverse events are judged to be pre-
ventable. It is believed that to improve quality and safety
in healthcare, hospitals have to create a patient safety cul-
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ture among their staff beside making structural interven-
tions. The culture of an organisation consists of the shared
norms, values, behaviour patterns, rituals and traditions
of the employees of an organization [10]. Safety culture is
an aspect of the organisational culture. A positive safety
culture guides the many discretionary behaviours of
healthcare professionals toward viewing patient safety as
one of their highest priorities [11]. The Institute of Medi-
cine states that if there is a safety culture where adverse
events can be reported without people being blamed, they
have the opportunity to learn from their mistakes and it is
possible to make improvements in order to prevent future
human and system errors, and thus promoting patient
safety [12].
Therefore, if hospitals want to improve patient safety, it is
important to know more about the culture regarding
patient safety. Several instruments are available to make
an assessment of the safety culture in hospitals [13,14].
One of these instruments is the Hospital Survey on Patient
Safety Culture (HSOPS) of the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) [15]. Previous research has
shown that the psychometric properties of the HSOPS in
the USA are good [13-15]. We translated the question-
naire into Dutch for application in the Netherlands [16].
We used forward-backward translation: the questions
were translated into Dutch by one translator and then
translated back into English by an independent translator
who was blinded to the original questionnaire [17].
The HSOPS is a commonly used instrument to measure
multiple dimensions of patient safety culture. It is being
used in the USA [18] and UK [19]. At the international
Patient Safety Research Conference in Porto in September
2007, it appeared that not only the Netherlands, but other
countries use a translation of the questionnaire as well,
including Belgium, Denmark and Norway. After translat-
ing a questionnaire into another language and applying it
in a different setting, it is important to check the validity
and reliability of the questionnaire in this new situation.
If the psychometric properties of the Dutch version of the
HSOPS are comparable to the original questionnaire,
cross country comparisons are possible and useful to get
more insight into the elements of patient safety culture in
specific countries.
Methods
Respondents
The Dutch version of the HSOPS was distributed in eight
hospitals in the Netherlands in June 2005. The hospitals
differed by teaching status: four general hospitals, three
teaching hospitals and one university hospital. The capac-
ity of these hospitals varied from 530 to 1120 beds. The
participating hospitals were located across the Nether-
lands. Within the eight hospitals, 23 units participated
(two to five units per hospital): six internal medicine
units, five intensive care units, three surgical units, three
emergency departments, two pediatrics units, two neurol-
ogy units and one psychiatry unit. Units and hospitals
were not randomly selected; units that participated were
about to introduce an incident reporting system at their
unit and they wanted to assess their patient safety culture
prior to the implementation of the new system. In each
unit, a random sample of about 30 healthcare providers
was drawn, depending on unit size. When the amount of
staff in a unit was less than 30 people, all healthcare pro-
viders of the unit were asked to participate.
The questionnaire was disseminated on paper through the
mail sorting boxes of all selected healthcare providers at
the unit. A research coordinator in the hospital took care
of the distribution. To allow for confidentiality, respond-
ents could send the questionnaire directly to the research-
ers outside the hospital in a postage-paid return envelope.
The management board and medical board of each partic-
ipating hospital formally consented to participate in the
study. Formal ethical approval was not needed for this
study according to Dutch law.
A total of 583 respondents completed the questionnaire.
Most respondents worked as registered nurses (59.8%).
Other respondents worked as medical consultants
(6.8%), resident physicians (6.0%), administrative staff
(4.3%), nurses in training (2.6%) or in management
(2.4%). These percentages give a reasonable reflection of
the real distribution of disciplines at the units.
Questionnaire
Background variables
Work-related information, e.g. the respondent's primary
department in hospital, how long he/she has been work-
ing at this unit, how many hours a week and in which
function.
Items on patient safety culture
Most items of patient safety culture can be answered using
a five-point scale reflecting the agreement rate: from
'strongly disagree' (1) to 'strongly agree' (5), with a neutral
category 'neither' (3). Other items can be answered using
a five-point frequency scale from 'never' (1) to 'always'
(5). In addition, there are two mono-item outcome varia-
bles: 1) Patient safety grade: measured with a five-point
scale, from 'excellent' (1) to 'failing' (5), and 2) Number
of events reported: how often the respondent has submit-
ted an event report in the past 12 months (answer catego-
ries: 'none', '1–2 event reports', '3–5 event reports', '6–10
event reports' and '11–20 event reports').
The original items have been validated by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) for the USABMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:230 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/230
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hospital setting [15]. Factor analysis resulted in 12 factors
(dimensions). The codes in brackets after each dimension
refer to the sections in the questionnaire and the numbers
of the questions.
F1 Teamwork across hospital units (F2, F4, F6, F10)
F2 Teamwork within units (A1, A3, A4, A11)
F3 Hospital handoffs and transitions (F3, F5, F7, F11)
F4 Frequency of event reporting (D1, D2, D3)
F5 Nonpunitive response to error (A8, A12, A16)
F6 Communication openness (C2, C4, C6)
F7 Feedback and communication about error (C1, C3,
C5)
F8 Organisational learning – continuous improvement
(A6, A9, A13)
F9 Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promot-
ing patient safety (B1, B2, B3, B4)
F10 Hospital management support for patient safety (F1,
F8, F9)
F11 Staffing (A2, A5, A7, A14)
F12 Overall perceptions of safety (A10, A15, A17, A18)
Data screening and pre-analyses
Completeness of the data was checked. Five respondents
were excluded from the analyses, because they had com-
pleted less than half of all items. When a respondent had
chosen two or more options at one item, this item was
marked as missing, which rarely occurred. Missing values
have been replaced by the respondents' mean scores on
the item. The highest numbers of missing values were
found at part D (Frequency of event reporting): 3.8% to
4.5% of the responses to these items were missing. No
items were excluded based on the percentage of missing
values. The distribution of only one variable was skewed,
i.e. Number of events reported. There were no variables with
80% or more answers in one category.
We checked whether the inter-item correlations were suf-
ficient, by an examination of the correlation matrix. Ques-
tions belonging to the same underlying dimension will
correlate as they measure the same aspect of patient safety
culture. Items that do not correlate, or correlate with only
a few other variables are not suited for factor analysis [20].
Bartlett's test demonstrated that the inter-item correla-
tions were sufficient: χ2 = 6456.8; df = 861; p < 0.001.
We also checked whether the opposite occurred: too much
correlation between the items. Ideally, every aspect of
patient safety culture uniquely contributes towards the
concept of patient safety culture. A high correlation
between two items means that patient safety culture
aspects overlap to a large extent. The overlap in the answer
patterns is about 50% when a correlation is 0.7 [20]. No
correlations exceeded this boundary score.
In addition, The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy (KMO) was determined. This value can range
from 0 to 1. A value near 1 indicates that there is hardly
any spread in the correlation pattern, enabling reliable
and distinctive dimensions by factor analysis [20]. The
KMO-score was 0.9; far above Kaiser's criterion of 0.5. The
pre-analyses demonstrate that the data can be used for fac-
tor analysis.
Statistical analyses
Factor analysis defines which items are closely linked and
refer jointly to an underlying dimension (or factor). The
items can thus be reduced to the smallest possible number
of concepts that still explain the largest possible part of the
variance [20]. A confirmative factor analysis was per-
formed (principal component analysis with Varimax rota-
tion) in order to investigate whether the factor structure of
the American questionnaire can be used with Dutch data.
The data were also studied with explorative factor analysis
(principal component analysis with Varimax rotation), in
order to check whether the items form different factors in
the Dutch situation. When establishing the number of fac-
tors, the Eigen value (Eigen value > 1: Kaiser's criterion)
was taken into account, beside the extent of explained var-
iance, the shape of the scree plot and the possibility of
interpreting the factors. Kaiser's criterion is reliable in a
sample of more than 250 respondents and when the aver-
age communality equals or is larger than 0.6. The shape of
the scree plot gives reliable information when the sample
is larger than 200 respondents [20]. The data satisfy these
conditions.
The internal consistency of the factors was calculated with
Cronbach's alpha (α), a value between 0 and 1. If different
items are supposed to measure the same concept, the
internal consistency (reliability) should be greater than or
equal to 0.6 [20]. Since the questionnaire contains posi-
tively as well as negatively worded items, the negatively
formulated items were first recoded to make sure that a
higher score always means a more positive response.
The construct validity was studied by calculating scale
scores for every factor (after any necessary reverse coding)BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:230 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/230
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and subsequently calculating Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients between the scale scores. The construct validity of
each factor is reflected in scale scores that are moderately
related. High correlations (r > 0.7), however, would indi-
cate that factors measure the same concept and these fac-
tors may be combined and/or some items could be
removed. In addition, correlations of the scale scores were
calculated with the outcome variable: Patient safety grade.
No correlations were calculated with the other outcome
variable, Number of events reported, because of the lack of
variability and skewed nature of this item (40% of the
respondents indicated not to have reported any events
during the past 12 months and 41% had reported only
one or two events). All statistical analyses were performed
using SPSS 12.0.
Results
Confirmative factor analysis
The 12 dimensions that resulted from the factor analysis
of the AHRQ [15], have already been mentioned above.
Items that formed one factor in the AHRQ study have
been studied in 12 separate factor analyses, to see whether
a group of items also loaded on one factor with the Dutch
data. All analyses showed that the items within one factor
indeed did not consist of more than one factor. At first
sight, the Dutch items appear to form the same factors as
the original questionnaire.
Additionally, the internal consistency has been calculated
for every factor and has been compared with the internal
consistency found in the American study (see Table 1, left
side).
For each factor, the internal consistency of the Dutch
items was lower than that of the original items in the
AHRQ study except for Communication Openness, which
was the same. The internal consistency of three factors was
poor or even unacceptable: Organisational learning – con-
tinuous improvement (α = 0.57), Staffing (α = 0.49) and
Teamwork across hospital units (α = 0.59). This gave occa-
sion to carry out an explorative factor analysis in order to
investigate if there is a factor structure that better fits the
Dutch data.
Explorative factor analysis
Eleven factors were drawn by explorative factor analysis.
The items of Organisational learning – continuous improve-
ment and Feedback and communication about error from the
American study combined into one factor instead of two
separate factors. To find out whether this factor would
Table 1: Characteristics of the factors after confirmative and explorative factor analysis
Confirmative factor analysis Explorative factor analysis
Factor No of items Chron-bach α 
American data
Chron-bach α 
Dutch data
Factor No of items Chron-bach α
Teamwork across 
hospital units
4 0.80 0.59 Teamwork across 
hospital units
5 0.72
Teamwork within units 4 0.83 0.66 Teamwork within 
units
4 0.66
Hospital handoffs and 
transitions
4 0.80 0.68 Adequate shift 
changes
2 0.65
Frequency of event 
reporting
3 0.84 0.79 Frequency of event 
reporting
3 0.79
Nonpunitive response 
to error
3 0.79 0.69 Nonpunitive response 
to error
3 0.69
Communication 
openness
3 0.72 0.72 Communication 
openness
3 0.72
Feedback and 
communication about 
error
3 0.78 0.75 Feedback about and 
learning from error
6 0.78
Organisational learning 
– Continuous 
improvement
3 0.76 0.57 * * *
Supervisor/manager 
expectations/actions
4 0.75 0.70 Supervisor/manager 
expectations/actions
4 0.70
Hospital management 
support for safety
3 0.83 0.68 Hospital management 
support for safety
3 0.68
Staffing 4 0.63 0.49 Adequate staffing 3 0.58
Overall perceptions of 
safety
4 0.74 0.62 Overall perceptions of 
safety
4 0.64
*The items of the American factors Feedback about and communication about error and Organisational learning – Continuous improvement combined into 
one factor, Feedback about and learning from error, in the explorative factor analysis.BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:230 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/230
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nevertheless split into two factors, a confirmative factor
analysis was done with only these six items. Again, the
items formed one factor. Another analysis was executed in
which the number of factors was forced at 12, in accord-
ance with the American solution (confirmative). Once
more, the factor consisted of the same six items. Besides,
items from other factors shifted in such a way that factors
could no longer be interpreted properly. The version with
11 factors was the best solution. Table 2 gives the mean
scores with standard deviations and factor loadings per
item. One item did not have a sufficient factor loading on
any of the factors (all loadings < 0.40), i.e.: 'Patient safety
is never sacrificed to get more work done' (A15).
The factors jointly explained 57.1% of the variance in the
responses. The internal consistency was calculated for
every factor. One item turned out to decrease the reliabil-
ity of a factor, i.e.: 'It is often unpleasant to work with staff
from other hospital units' (F6). After this item had been
removed from factor 6, Communication Openness, the
internal consistency increased from 0.65 to 0.72. The item
has not been used in further analyses. The internal con-
sistency of ten factors was acceptable (0.64 < α < 0.79),
but factor 10, Adequate staffing was doubtful (α = 0.58).
Table 1 (right side) gives the number of items and the
internal consistency per factor after the explorative factor
analysis.
Construct validity
For each of the 11 factors, scale scores were calculated by
obtaining the mean of the item scores within one factor
for every respondent. Next, correlations between the scale
scores were calculated. Table 3 shows the mean factor
scores with standard deviations, and the correlations
between the factors.
The highest correlations were those between Feedback
about and learning from error and Supervisor/manager expec-
tations and actions (r = 0.47) and between Feedback about
and learning from error and Hospital management support (r
= 0.47), but no correlation was exceptionally high.
Additionally, correlations of the scales with the mono-
item outcome variable Patient safety grade have been calcu-
lated. The factors were expected to correlate positively
with this outcome measure. All correlations with Patient
safety grade were significant. The highest correlation of this
outcome measure was with Overall perceptions of safety (r =
0.56).
Discussion
In the 11-factor model, the reliability (internal consist-
ency) of the factors and construct validity are acceptable.
Two items of the original questionnaire have been elimi-
nated: 'Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more work
done' (A15) and 'It is often unpleasant to work with staff
from other hospital units' (F6). The internal consistency
of one factor, i.e. Adequate staffing remained questionable
(α = 0.58). This was no reason to remove the factor from
the questionnaire, because the three items match well and
they concern an important organisational characteristic
that influences patient safety.
The construct validity was satisfactory for all factors; the
moderate correlations of the factors show that there are no
two factors measuring the same construct. As expected, all
factors correlated with the outcome variable Patient safety
grade. The high correlation of Patient safety grade with
Overall perceptions of safety is an indication for the validity
of the latter scale. The higher the overall safety perceptions
are, the higher the rating for patient safety, and vice versa.
The factor structure with 11 factors slightly deviates from
the structure with 12 factors proposed by the AHRQ. The
main difference is that the factor Feedback about and learn-
ing from error consisted of two separate factors in the
American study: Organisational learning – Continuous
improvement and Feedback and communication about error. It
is not surprising that both factors' items turned out to be
linked. Error feedback and improvements induced by
errors are closely related. Communication with the staff
plays an important role in making improvements in
patient safety. There is no obvious explanation for the fact
that in the American study, nevertheless, two factors
occurred. The English wording might have directed more
towards the difference between talking about errors and
taking action based on errors, i.e. the distinction between
words and actions. The two factors might have merged in
the American data too if a factor analysis was carried out
which was forced at 11 factors. The remaining differences
in the factor structure only concern item shifts between
factors. Table 4 sums up the differences.
There was a difference within the factor Overall perceptions
of safety. Instead of the item 'Patient safety is never sacri-
ficed to get more work done'(A15), the item: 'We work in
"crisis mode" trying to do too much, too quickly'(A14)
became part of this factor. In the American study, item
A14 belonged to Staffing. However, it fits very well with
the other items that measure the overall patient safety per-
ceptions. It is not clear why the factor loading of A15 was
low in this factor, but the item might point to wittingly
and actively unsafe behaviour, while the other items
within the factor are more related to latent (system) prob-
lems. Because the item did not load sufficiently on any of
the factors, it was removed from the questionnaire.
Furthermore, two items loaded on Teamwork across hospital
units, while in the American study these were part of Hos-
pital handoffs and transitions, i.e.: 'Things "fall between theBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:230 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/230
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Table 2: Mean scores and factor loadings of the items regarding patient safety culture
I t e m M e a n S DF 1F 2F 3F 4F 5F 6F 7F 8F 9F 1 0 F 1 1
F4 There is good cooperation among hospital 
units that need to work together
3.04 0.79 0.73
F10 Hospital units work well together to provide 
the best care for patients
3.05 0.80 0.72
F2n Hospital units do not coordinate well with 
each other
3.51 0.75 -0.60
F3n Things "fall between the cracks" when 
transferring patients from one unit to another
3.49 0.80 -0.52 0.51
F7n Problems often occur in the exchange of 
information across hospital units
3.04 0.80 -0.47 0.47
A3 When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, 
we work together as a team to get the work 
done
3.91 0.59 0.73
A1 People support one another in this unit 4.00 0.60 0.71
A11 When one area in this unit gets really busy, 
others help out
3.78 0.68 0.63
A4 In this unit, people treat each other with 
respect
3.87 0.62 0.59
F11n Shift changes are problematic for patients in 
this hospital
2.45 0.72 0.76
F5n Important patient care information is often 
lost during shift changes
2.59 0.85 0.71
D2 When a mistake is made, but has no potential 
to harm the patient, how often is this 
reported?
2.89 1.07 0.88
D3 When a mistake is made that could harm the 
patient, but does not, how often is this 
reported?
3.42 1.00 0.79
D1 When a mistake is made, but is caught and 
corrected before affecting the patient, how 
often is this reported?
2.40 1.06 0.67
A16n Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept 
in their personnel file
2.37 0.77 0.74
A12n When an event is reported, it feels like the 
person is being written up, not the problem
2.58 0.83 0.74
A8n Staff feel like their mistakes are held against 
them
2.22 0.81 0.68
F6n It is often unpleasant to work with staff from 
other hospital units
2.43 0.67 -0.62
C2 Staff will freely speak up if they see something 
that may negatively affect patient care
3.95 0.67 0.59
C4 Staff feel free to question the decisions or 
actions of those with more authority
3.56 0.77 0.58
C6n Staff are afraid to ask questions when 
something does not seem right
2.26 0.73 -0.56
C3 We are informed about errors that happen in 
this unit
3.39 0.98 0.73
C1 We are given feedback about changes put 
into place based on event reports
2.99 1.06 0.70
C5 In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors 
from happening again
3.69 0.80 0.65
A9 Mistakes have led to positive changes here 3.38 0.72 0.53
A13 After we make changes to improve patient 
safety, we evaluate their effectiveness
3.13 0.84 0.52
A6 We are actively doing things to improve 
patient safety
3.45 0.81 0.47
B3n Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor/
manager wants us to work faster, even if it 
means taking shortcuts
2.21 0.72 -0.69
B2 My supervisor/manager seriously considers 
staff suggestions for improving patient safety.
3.79 0.61 0.67
B4n My supervisor/manager overlooks patient 
safety problems that happen over and over
2.25 0.74 -0.64BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:230 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/230
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cracks" when transferring patients from one unit to
another'(F3) and 'Problems often occur in the exchange of
information across hospital units'(F7). In the Dutch
study, these items loaded just slightly more on Teamwork
across hospital units than on Adequate shift changes. The dis-
tinction between the two factors might be more lucid in
the Dutch situation. One factor concerns cooperation and
handoffs between units while the other concerns chang-
ing shifts within units.
Finally, there was initially a difference within the factor
Communication openness. The item 'It is often unpleasant to
work with staff from other hospital units'(F6) belonged to
this factor, while in the American study it belonged to
Teamwork across hospital units. Calculation of the internal
consistency of Communication openness showed that the
item reduced the factor's reliability and, therefore, the
item has been left out of further analyses and deleted from
the questionnaire. As a result, the structure of Communica-
tion openness in the Dutch study still matches the structure
of Communication Openness in the American study.
B1 My supervisor/manager says a good word 
when he/she sees a job done according to 
established patient safety procedures
3.02 0.92 0.59
F8 The actions of hospital management show 
that patient safety is a top priority
2.73 0.81 0.74
F9n Hospital management seems interested in 
patient safety only after an adverse event 
happens
3.07 0.82 -0.71
F1 Hospital management provides a work 
climate that promotes patient safety
3.21 0.81 0.53
A5n Staff in this unit work longer hours than is 
best for patient care
2.22 0.73 0.72
A2 We have enough staff to handle the workload 3.40 0.92 -0.67
A7n We use more agency/temporary staff than is 
best for patient care
2.00 0.86 0.66
A17n We have patient safety problems in this unit 2.60 0.87 0.68
A18 Our procedures and systems are good at 
preventing errors from happening
2.97 0.83 -0.61
A10n It is just by chance that more serious mistakes 
don't happen around here
2.47 0.81 0.60
A14n We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too 
much, too quickly
2.57 0.79 0.48
A15 Patient safety is never sacrificed to get more 
work done
3.19 0.95 -0.36
Note: Factor loadings > 0.40 are shown. Factor loadings in italics indicate that this was not the preferred option.
The letter 'n' in a code means that it concerns an item in negative wording.
Table 2: Mean scores and factor loadings of the items regarding patient safety culture (Continued)
Table 3: Mean factor scores, correlation with patient safety grade and intercorrelations of the 11 dimensions
Factor Mean SD Patient safety grade 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Teamwork across hospital units 2.82 0.54 0.29
2 Teamwork within units 3.89 0.44 0.22 0.14
3 Adequate shift changes 3.48 0.68 0.25 0.39 0.20
4 Frequency of event reporting 2.91 0.88 0.26 0.16 0.11 0.15
5 Nonpunitive response to error 3.61 0.63 0.19 0.15 0.29 0.20 0.22
6 Communication openness 3.76 0.58 0.34 0.22 0.34 0.30 0.24 0.37
7 Feedback about and learning 
from error
3.34 0.61 0.40 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.43 0.30 0.46
8 Supervisor/manager 
expectations/actions
3.58 0.55 0.37 0.17 0.35 0.19 0.19 0.36 0.46 0.47
9 Hospital management support 
for patient safety
2.96 0.64 0.36 0.35 0.15 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.34 0.47 0.36
10 Adequate staffing 3.73 0.62 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.01† 0.24 0.15 0.01† 0.22 0.16
11 Overall perceptions of safety 3.33 0.57 0.56 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.33
Note: Factor 10 in relation with factor 1, 2 and 3 is significant at p < 0.05; the remaining correlations are significant at p < 0.01.
† Not significant.BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:230 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/230
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Conclusion
The factor structures of the Dutch and American Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety Culture are almost identical. The
main part of the factor structure is the same and nearly all
items are kept. There are only small shifts of items across
factors. The Dutch factors show, undeniably, a lower
internal consistency than in the American study. The fac-
tors' internal consistency has, however, become more
acceptable by removing weak elements and by shifting
items.
This study demonstrates that the Hospital Survey on
Patient Safety Culture is an appropriate instrument to
assess patient safety culture in Dutch hospitals. Before sur-
vey results can be compared between different countries,
it is important to have insight into the validity and relia-
bility of the HSOPS in these countries. The psychometric
properties of the Dutch translation of the HSOPS are
promising for other countries who want to translate and
use the questionnaire and for cross country comparisons
of survey results in the future. Moreover, in another pub-
lication of the authors, multilevel analysis has shown that
the questionnaire measures unit culture and not just indi-
vidual attitudes [21].
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